Constitutional Law - Trial of a United States Soldier by a Foreign Power by McLeod, William L., Jr.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 18 | Number 1
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1956-1957 Term
December 1957
Constitutional Law - Trial of a United States Soldier
by a Foreign Power
William L. McLeod Jr.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
William L. McLeod Jr., Constitutional Law - Trial of a United States Soldier by a Foreign Power, 18 La. L. Rev. (1957)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol18/iss1/36
NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - TRIAL OF A UNITED STATES SOLDIER BY
A FOREIGN POWER
Respondent, while guarding equipment of the United States
Army in Japan, shot and killed a Japanese civilian who was col-
lecting expended cartridge cases. Under the Administrative
Agreement' between the United States and Japan regarding
criminal jurisdiction over American forces stationed in Japan,
the Japanese Government sought and obtained a waiver of juris-
diction from the United States Government. However, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia grant-
ed an order restraining the surrender of respondent to the Jap-
anese authorities.2 On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States, held, reversed. The Constitution contains no barrier to
the surrender of a soldier to foreign jurisdiction for trial pur-
suant to a treaty. Girard v. Wilson, 1 L.Ed.2d 1544 (U.S. 1957).
1. Although the making of this arrangement for criminal jurisdiction took the
form of an executive agreement, as opposed to a treaty, the Supreme Court viewed
the agreement, popularly known as "Status of Forces Agreement," as a treaty.
This is because the Senate had ratified the Security Treaty with Japan, April 28,
1952, [1952] 3 U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS 3329, T.I.A.S. No.
2491, which treaty had called for an agreement which had in fact already been
signed when the Senate ratified the Security Treaty. This latter agreement, Ad-
ministrative Agreement Under Article III of the Security Treaty with Japan,
February 28, 1952, [1952] 3 U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS 3341,
T.I.A.S. No. 2492, had provided for its own amendment by the adoption of such
terms as would be agreed upon by the NATO countries. Later the Senate ratified
the NATO Agreements, June 19, 1951, [1953] 4 U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT'L
AGREEMENTS 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, which were the basis of the present agree-
ment with Japan, Administrative Agreement Under Article III of the Security
Treaty with Japan, Amendment of Article XVII, September 29, 1953, [1953] 4
U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS 1846, T.I.A.S. No. 2848. Paragraph
3 of Article XVII of the Status of Forces Agreement with Japan dealt with crim-
inal offenses in violation of the laws of both nations and provided:
"(a) The military authorities of the United States shall have the primary
right to exercise jurisdiction over members of the United States armed forces
or the civilian component in relation to
"(i) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States,
or offenses solely against the person or property of another member of the
United States armed forces or the civilian component or of a dependent;
"(ii) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the performance
of official duty.
"(b) In the case of any other offense the authorities of Japan shall have
the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.
"(c) If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise juris-
diction, it shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon as practicable.
The authorities of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic
consideration to a request from the authorities of the other State for a waiver
of its right in cases where that other State considers such waiver to be of
particular importance."
2. New York Times, June 19, 1957, p. 6, col. 1.
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The decision of the Supreme Court admits of two interpreta-
tions: (1) that the respondent had no constitutional right to
trial by the United States authorities, or (2) that even if the
respondent had a constitutional right to trial by the United
States authorities, this right could be surrendered pursuant to
a treaty.3
Under the Constitution there is no specific guarantee that a
person accused of crime will be tried by the United States au-
thorities. In general, criminal trials are conducted by the states
in the exercise of their police power. The states may be deprived
of this jurisdiction, however, where the accused is a federal
agent acting in the fulfillment of his duties. 4 As to the armed
forces there is a constitutional provision which grants to the
United States the power to make rules for the regulation and
government of them.5 This grant allows the federal government
to remove accused servicemen from the jurisdiction of state
courts and to subject them instead to a trial by the federal au-
thorities.6 However, this removal from the jurisdiction of the
states is not an individual constitutional right of a serviceman.
It is the exercise by the United States of a constitutional grant to
the United States. T That this is no personal right is shown by the
3. The. opinion detailed the facts of the case, and then declared that a nation
has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses committed within its territory unless
it has given its consent that another sovereign should have jurisdiction. Then the
Court said: "The issue for our decision is therefore narrowed to the question
whether, upon the record before us, the Constitution or legislation subsequent to
the Security Treaty prohibited the carrying out of this provision authorized by the
Treaty for waiver of the qualified jurisdiction granted by Japan. We find no con-
stitutional or statutory barrier to the provision as applied here. In the absence
of such encroachments, the wisdom of the arrangement is exclusively for the de-
termination of the Executive and Legislative Branches." Girard v. Wilson, 1.
L.Ed.2d 1544 (U.S. 1957).
4. Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899) ; In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890)
Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1880) (dictum) ; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S.
371, 395 (1879) (dictum) ; In re Wulzen, 235 Fed. 362 (S.D. Ohio 1916) ; United
States v. Lipsett, 156 Fed. 65 (W.D. Mich. 1907) ; In re Fair, 100 Fed. 149 (Neb.
1900) ; Annot., 65 A.L.R. 733 (1930).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 14.
6. Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 514 (1878) (dictum) Pappens v.
United States, 252 Fed. 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1918) (dictum) ; Ex parte King, 246 Fed.
868 (E.D. Ky. 1917) ; MAYERS, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 505 (1955).
Contra, Brown v. Cain, 56 F. Supp. 56, 58 (E.D. Pa. 1944) (dictum) ; United
States v. Lipsett, 156 Fed. 65, 70 (W.D. Mich. 1907) (dictum) ; In re Waite, 81
Fed. 359, 363 (N.D. Iowa 1897) (dictum).
7. This point has been dealt with in relation to a federal agent, not a service-
man, who was arrested for an act committed in the pursuit of federal business.
In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 61 (1890), said: "The general government must cease
to exist whenever it loses the power of protecting itself in the exercise of consti-
tutional powers. . . . It can act only through its officers and agents, and they
must act within the States. If, when thus acting, and within the scope of their
authority, those officers can be arrested and brought to trial in a state court, for
an alleged offense against the law of the State, yet warranted by the federal
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fact that by statute the United States authorizes waiver of its
right to try a serviceman, and allows the states to exercise crim-
inal jurisdiction.8 The decision to try by court martial or in a
state court is an executive decision to be made by the appropriate
Secretary.0 The determining factor in his decision need be only
national policy. 10 From this it follows that a soldier's trial by the
federal government is no individual right, but rather a mani-
festation of federal sovereignty in a delegated field.1
The Supreme Court may have based its opinion on the belief
that the treaty power was lawfully used in giving the Japanese
jurisdiction over American soldiers stationed there. The treaty
power is one constitutionally-authorized method of dealing with
other nations. 12 In view of the flexibility and dispatch which is
authority they possess, and if the general government is powerless to interfere at
once for their protection . . . the operations of the general government may at
any time be arrested at the will of one of its members .. . .We do not think such
an element of weakness is to be found in the Constitution. The United States is
a government with authority extending over the whole territory of the Union,
acting upon the States and the people of the States. While it is limited in the
number of its powers, so far as its sovereignty extends it is supreme. No state
government can exclude it from the exercise of any authority conferred upon it
by the Constitution; obstruct its authorized officers against its will; or with-
hold from it, for a moment, the cognizance of any subject which that instrument
has committed to it." Campbell v. Waite, 88 Fed. 102, 108 (8th Cir. 1898).
8. The Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 14, 64 STAT. 112 (1950), as
amended, 10 U.S.C. § 814 (Supp. IV, 1957) says that the accused "may" be
delivered to the civil authorities in accordance with rules promulgated by the ap-
propriate Secretary. A reason for the permissive nature of the surrender to the
civilian authorities is found in WIENER, THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
62 (1950). The author says: "The present [1950, before U.C.M.J. went into effect]
Army practice [compulsory surrender of a soldier to civil authorities under Article
of War 74] was adopted at a time when the Army did not have authority to try
its personnel for civil offenses in time of peace, so that if a man were not deliv-
ered up he would not be tried at all. Since the armed forces now have such au-
thority, the mandatory feature of AW 74 is felt to be unnecessary."
9. The Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 14, 64 STAT. 112 (1950), as
amended, 10 U.S.C. § 814(a) (Supp. IV, 1957). "Under such regulations as the
Secretary concerned may prescribe, a member of the armed forces accused of an
offense against civil authority may be delivered, upon request, to the civil authority
for trial."
10. This follows from the fact that the statute sets up no criteria. The de-
cision rests in the discretion of the Secretary or the subordinates to whom he
delegates this authority.
11. International law seems clear in affirming the right of Japan to try the
respondent. International law recognizes the supremacy of the laws of the nation
in which the crime is perpetrated. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116, 135 (1812) (dictum). The only way in which a sending country can
refuse a receiving country any jurisdiction at all over the soldiers' of the sending
country is by virtue of express or implied consent of the receiving country. Ibid.
When an agreement expressly allows the receiving country to exercise jurisdiction,
there is no basis in international law for alleging an exclusive right to trial by the
sending country, because international law recognizes the right of every sovereign
to barter the rights of its citizens. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 335 (1938).
In United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801), the court
allowed a treaty to cancel rights of a citizen in property.
12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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often needed in international relations, it has been held that the
executive department in handling foreign relations is not bound
by constitutional restrictions to the same degree as it is when
engaged in domestic activities.I 3 However, this is not to say that
a treaty cannot be unconstitutional. The court has repeatedly
declared that the treaty power is limited,14 but no treaty has ever
been declared unconstitutional. 15 The precise limitations can
only be guessed at by relying on such vague phrases as "not in
violation of the Constitution,' 0 and "proper subjects for nego-
tiation between governments.' 7 Presumably, a treaty the effect
of which is to abridge freedom of speech would be unconstitu-
tional.'8 The rationale would probably be that the indefinite
treaty power could not be said to impinge on a specifically guar-
anteed individual right. In less clear-cut cases it will be neces-
sary to balance the authority granted by the treaty power
against the rights of the individual. The outcome would turn on
considerations such as the end for which the treaty power was
used, the necessity for the treaty, and the individual right con-
cerned. As for the instant case, there can be no doubt that the
stationing of troops abroad in the interest of national defense
is a legitimate function of the federal government. 9 It is gen-
13. United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) ; United
States v. Rosenberg, 150 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1945) ; United States v. Von Clemm,
136 F.2d 968, 970 (2d Cir. 1943) (dictum).
14. Reid v. Covert, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148, 1163 (1957) ("It would be manifestly
contrary to the objectives of those who created the Constitution, as well as those
who were responsible for the Bill of Rights '. . to construe Article VI as permit-
ting the United States to exercise power under an international agreement with-
out observing constitutional prohibitions") ; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,
433 (1919) ("We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the
treaty-making power") ; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 370 (1900) ("A treaty
which undertook to take away what the Constitution secured or to enlarge the
Federal jurisdiction would be simply void") (dissenting opinion); Geofroy v.
Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) ("It would not be contended that it [a treaty]
extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids") ; Holden v. Joy,
84 U.S. 211, 243 (1872) (a treaty must be "not inconsistent with the nature of
our government and the relation between the States and the United States"). See
also notes 16 and 17 infra.
15. SvARLEIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF NATIONs 266 (1955). No
executive agreement has ever been declared unconstitutional either. Mathews, The
Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International Agreements, 64
YALE L.J. 345, 377 (1955).
16. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620 (1870).
17. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1923) ; In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453,
463 (1890) ; Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890) ; Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S.
211, 243 (1872).
18. In Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890), the court said: "It would
not be contended that it [a treatyl extends so far as to authorize what the Con-
stitution forbids." In the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
abridging the freedom of speech is specifically forbidden.
19. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1917) ; Story v. Perkins, 243
NOTES
erally conceded that sending American forces abroad is a neces-
sary part of the national defense effort. This is based on a belief
that a strong and strategically placed military establishment is
the best deterrent to foreign aggression. With these compelling
considerations apparent, it would be unfortunate to insist on al-
leged rights which might impair the national defense. If the
United States were to insist on complete jurisdiction over its
soldiers abroad, the countries now receiving these troops might
demand their withdrawal. Self-respect and a desire to redress
wrongs done to the citizens of the receiving country make this
position understandable. In view of this military situation, as
well as the tendency of the court to allow greater executive dis-
cretion in foreign relations, it would seem proper to allow the
treaty power to take precedence over what is at best an indefi-
nite constitutional right. This analysis, however, must be quali-
fied. If the receiving country has notions of justice which are
radically different from the American view, the court might find
that the treaty was unconstitutional as denying due process of
law.
20
Closely analogous .to the present situation is the idea of ex-
tradition. When an American citizen commits a crime in a for-
eign country, and then flees from that jurisdiction and returns
to the United States, this country may return the accused to the
place of the alleged crime. 21 Based on international comity,22
extradition treaties do not violate constitutional rights to trial
by jury or other fundamental rights. The court has stated that
constitutional guarantees have no relation to crimes committed
Fed. 997 (S.D. Ga. 1917), affirmed, 245 U.S. 390 (1917) ; United States v.
Stephens, 245 Fed. 956 (D. Del. 1917), affirmed, 247 U.S. 504 (1917).
20. In Saudi Arabia the king has absolute power of life or death over the
people. If an American soldier were "tried" in that country, it would be doubtful
that a treaty authorizing the application of those standards of justice would find
favor with an American court. It is interesting to note that the executive agree-
ment between Saudi Arabia and the United States in Section 13 gives jurisdiction
to Saudi Arabia over American military personnel who commit offenses outside
certain designated limits. Agreement Concerning Air Base at Dhuhran, June 18,
1951, [19511 2 U.S. TREATIES & OTHEa INT'L AGREEMENTS 1474, T.I.A.S. No.
2290. That such an agreement could be considered invalid as a violation of due
process is also advanced in Note, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1043, 1054 (1957). In view
of the fact that Article 12 of the French Code Penal requires the use of the guil-
lotine, it is interesting to speculate as to whether that instrument would meet
due process requirements.
21. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1900); Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258
(6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, No. 183, U.S. Sup. Ct. Bull. Current Term, p. 8024
(October 14, 1957).
22. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 414 (1886) (dictum). That
extradition was a lawful exercise of the treaty-making power was declared in
Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1901), and in Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S.
(14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840).
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outside the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of
a foreign country.2 3 American citizenship does not give an Amer-
ican immunity from prosecution for the commission of crimes
in other countries, or entitle him to a trial in any other mode
than that allowed to its own people by the country from the laws
of which he has fled.24 The only difference between a case of
extradition and the instant case is that the respondent here is in
military service. However, the fact that the respondent did not
voluntarily leave the protection of continental United States law
does not create in him a constitutional right which he had never
had before, nor does it reduce the extent of the treaty-making
power of the United States. The involuntary nature of a soldier's
station is simply one more factor affecting the public opinion
which the United States Government must consider in bargain-
ing with another sovereign. It appears that the United States'
adherence to comity in international relations is sufficient to
justify a treaty by which American citizens are surrendered to
foreign powers in derogation of what respondent would call his
constitutional right to trial by the United States authorities. The
extradition example of the needs of the sovereign as weighed
against the rights of the individual would seem adequate prece-
dent for a like result in the instant case. Therefore, it is sub-
mitted that the decision of the United States Supreme Court is
legally sound.
William L. McLeod, Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF LOUISIANA FAIR-TRADE LAW
Plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from selling products
bearing the plaintiff's brand at a price below the minimum
which had been set in accordance with the Louisiana Fair-Trade
Act.' Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the act, and
particularly the "non-signer" clause which prohibited non-con-
tracting retailers from wilfully selling plaintiff's products under
23. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1900) ; Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258
(6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, No. 183, U.S. Sup. Ct. Bull. Current Term, p. 8024
(October 14, 1957).
24. See note 23 supra.
1. La. Acts 1936, No. 13, p. 62, incorporated as LA. R.S. 51:394 (1950). The
act consists of a contract clause providing that a contract shall not be invalid by
reason of a stipulated minimum price, and the contested non-signer clause which
states: "Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling at less
than the minimum price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the
provision of R.S. 51:392, whether the person so advertising, offering for sale, or
selling is or is not a party to the contract, is unfair competition and is actionable
by any person damaged."
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